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NOTES
DUE PROCESS RIGHTS OF MENTALLY ILL PARENTS IN
NONCONSENSUAL ADQPTIONS
Persons afflicted with mental illness are, during their confinement in
an institution, unable to care for their children. Statutory provisions for
the adoption of these children, irrespective of the wishes and without
regard for the prognosis of the mentally diseased parent, have been en-
acted in many states.' The absolute permanence of adoption2 and the
increasing impermanence of mental illness3 posit a query as to the degree
1. ALA. CODE tit. 27, § 3 (1940); Amz. CODE ANN. § 27-203 (Supp. 1952) ; ARIC.
STAT. ANN. § 56-106 (1947); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1104 (Supp. 1954); GA. CODE
ANN. § 74-404 (Supp. 1951); ILL. ANN. STAT. tit. 19, § 19.012(10 1/2) (Supp. 1953);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 600.3 (Supp. 1954); Ky. REV. STAT. § 199.500 (1953); ME. REV.
STAT. c. 158, § 37 (1954); MASS. ANN. LAWS c. 210, § 3 (Supp. 1953) ; MIcH. Cor.
LAWS § 710.3 (1948); MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 259.24 (West Supp. 1954); Miss. CODE
ANN. § 1269 (1942); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 453.040 (Vernon 1949); NEV. ComP. LAWS
§ 9478 (Supp. 1941); N.J. REV. STAT. § 9:3-24 (Supp. 1953) ; N.Y. DoMt. REL. LAW §
111; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-9 (Supp. 1953); N.D. REv. CODE § 14-1104 (Supp. 1953);
OHIO REv. CODE § 3107.06 (1954); ORE. ComP. LAWs ANN. § 109.320 (1940); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 1, § 2 (Supp. 1954); R.I. GEN. LAWS c. 420, § 3 (1938); S.D. CODE § 14.0403
(1939); TENN. CODE ANN. § 9572.21 (Williams Supp. 1952); WASH. REV. CODE §
26.32.040 (1951) ; W. VA. CODE ANN. § 4755 (1949); Wyo. Comr. STAT. ANN. § 58-211
(1945).
2. "Adoption, which affects the course of inheritance, deprives the child of a place
in which it was placed by nature, and by force of law thrusts the child into another
relationship, while severing forever and conclusively the legal rights and interests of
the natural parents, and is a very different matter from a change of custody, which
could be on a temporary basis." Jackson v. Russell, 342 Ill. App. 637, 639, 97 N.E.2d
584, 585 (1951). If there was notice and a lack of fraud the only means by which
an adoption decree may be vacated is by a demonstration of a failure to comply with
the procedural requirements of the statute. See Note, 61 YALE L.J. 591 (1952).
3. Dr. Daniel Blain, medical director of the American Psychiatric Association,
testifying before the House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee, predicted
"that the time would come soon when 'the great majority, of the mentally ill can be
treated and returned to the community in a relatively short period of time.'" N.Y.
Times, March 10, 1955, p. 49, col. 1. Significant advances have recently been made
in the development of drugs for the treatment of mental illness. Two drugs, chlor-
promazine and reserpine, have produced noteworthy results in the treatment of various
disorders. By the use of reserpine, in a seven month survey, "patients have undergone
a metamorphosis from raging, combative, unsociable persons to cooperative, friendly,
cheerful, sociable, relatively quiet persons who are amenable to psychotherapy and
rehabilitative measures." Noce, Williams, and Rapaport, Reserphne in the Management
of the Mentally Ill and Mentally Retarded, 156 J. Am. MED. Ass'N. 821, 822 (1954).
"[W]e expect it [reserpine] to revolutionize and facilitate modern psychiatric treat-
ment." Id. at 823. Similar results have been obtained with the use of chlorpromazine.
Lehman and Hanrahan, Chlorpromazine-New Inhibiting Agent for Psychomotor Ex-
citement and Manic States, 71 Am. MED. Ass'N. ARCH. NEUROL. & PSYCHIAT. 227
(1954). Apparently referring to these, Dr. Winfred Overholser, Superintendent of St.
Elizabeth's Hospital, D.C., declared, "there are very interesting new drugs coming
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of seriousness of the parental afflication which should be required to
sustain such nonconsensual adoption. In both denoting such a standard
and formulating procedures for its effectuation, the states have mani-
fested an eminent disinterestedness in protecting the rights of mentally
ill parents.
Problems created by mental illness occur in various phases of law, but
the resolution of none is so final in its effect upon the afflicted person as
adoption.' An adoption is much more than a mere shift of custody of a
child from one family to another. It is a permanent alteration which
affects the right of inheritance5 and the name' of the child; since adoption
proceedings are kept secret7 the natural parents may not even know who
has possession of their child. Custody proceedings are temporary, affect-
ing neither the child's inheritance nor his name.'
along . . . They are not a panacea, but I believe we are on the verge of a new era in
drugs." N.Y. Times, March 9, 1955, p. 48, col. 3. Another development in psycho-
therapy, introduced in 1955, is a process called chemopallidectomy. It is a new form
of brain surgery utilizing chemicals in place of the knife. N.Y. Times, March 5, 1955,
p. 17, col. 1.
4. Questions arise as to the capability of mentally ill persons to enter contracts, to
commit torts and crimes, to sue, and to serve as witnesses. There is also a problem
as to the sufficiency of mental illness as ground for divorce. Even involuntary commit-
ment in a mental intitution has not the permanent effect of adoption since commitment
is only until recovery. See, e.g., ARiz. CODE ANN. § 8-307 (Supp. 1952); MASS. ANN.
LAWS c. 123, § 89 (1949) ; N.Y. MENT. HYG. LAW § 87; NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF MEN-
TAL HEALTH, FEDERAL SECURITY AGENCY, A DRAFT ACT GOVERNING HOSPITALIZATION
OF THE MENTALLY ILL § 15 (Public Health Service Pub. No. 51, rev. ed. 1952). For a
concise treatment of problems arising as a result of mental disease, and their resolution
in the law, see 5 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS §§ 301-311 (1936). One'deter-
mination of mental status, that involved in sterilization of mental deficients, has results
as permanent as those in adoption. See note 78 infra.
5. In some states the child may inherit through both the adoptive and the natural
parents. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 27, § 5 (1940); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 72.22 (Supp.
1953) ; IND. ANN. STAT. § 3-121 (Burns 1933) ; Ky. REV. STAT. § 199.530 (1953) ; MASS.
ANN. LAWS c. 210, § 7 (1933); N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 115. Many states permit in-
heritance only through the adoptive parents. See, e.g., ARiz. CODE ANN. § 27-207 (Supp.
1952) ; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 920 (1953) ; GA. CODE ANN. § 74-414 (1951) ; IOWA
CODE ANN. § 600.6 (Supp. 1953); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.29 (West Supp. 1954);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 453.080 (Vernon 1949). The general rule that children may inherit
through their adoptive parents is discussed in 4 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS
§ 262 (1936).
6. It is commonly provided that the adopted child take the name of the adoptive
parent. See, e.g., ARIz. CODE ANN. § 27-207 (Supp. 1952); GA. CODE ANN. § 74-404
(Supp. 1951); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.06 (West 1947); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 453.080
(Vernon 1949); N.Y. Dom. RE. LAW § 114.
7. ALA. CODE tit. 27, § 5 (1940) ; IOWA CODE ANN. § 600.9 (Supp. 1954) ; Ky. REV.
STAT. § 199.570 (1953); ME. REV. STAT. c. 158, § 39 (1954); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 711
(1948); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 453.120 (Vernon 1949); N.J. REV. STAT. § 9:3-31 (Supp.
1953); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 4 (Supp. 1954); TENN. CODE ANN. § 9572.38 (Williams
Supp. 1952); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.32.150 (1951).
8. See note 15 infra and accompanying text for a comparison of adoption and
custody proceedings.
NOTES
The early adoption statutes' were voluntary, the consent of the natural
parents being required for a valid adoption.'" However, it has been widely
enacted that parental consent to an adoption may be obviated by parental
behavior deleterious to the welfare of the child." By such conduct the
parent is said to forfeit his right. 2 The public interest which engendered
such a policy of adoptions against the will of the parent is clear from the
cases; the enactments are social legislation seeking to protect the welfare
of children and to prevent them from becoming wards of the state.'3 The
cases generally recognize as essestial an element of willfulness in such
parental conduct, as in abandonment, neglect, or cruelty.' 4 A custody
proceeding requires no such volitive behavior and may be sustained on
the ground of poverty, illness, or other misfortunes which are clearly an
9. The history of adoption, as an institution, is ancient. It dates back to pre-
Biblical times and has become a part of the law of most of the continental countries.
Although custody proceedings were familiar in equity, adoption is not a part of the
Common Law of England or the United States and is in those systems entirely statu-
tory. The first adoption statute in the United States was enacted by Massachusetts,
Mass. Acts 1851, c. 324, §8 1-8. England had no such provision until 1926. Adoption
of Children Act, 1926, 16 & 17 Geo. 5, c. 29. For an exhaustive treatment of adoption
in ancient and civil law see Brosnan, The Law of Adoption, 22 COLUM. L. REv. 332
(1922).
10. Mass. Acts 1851, c. 324, 88 1-8; Me. Acts 1855, c. 189, §§ 1-10; N.H. Laws
1862, c. 2603, 8H 1-9.
11. These enactments are thoroughly treated in Comment, A Compilation of Con-
sent Provisions of Adoption Statutes, 24 RocKY MT. L. REv. 359 (1952).
12. Nugent v. Powell, 4 Wyo. 173, 33 P. 23 (1893). Parents do not have property
rights but have rights correlative to and dependent upon fulfilling the parental duties.
Purinton v. Jamrock, 195 Mass. 187, 80 N.E. 802 (1907); Sullivan v. People, 224
Ill. 468, 79 N.E. 695 (1906); Lacher v. Venus, 177 Wis. 558, 188 N.W. 613 (1922);
Hersey v. Hersey, 271 Mass. 545, 171 N.E. 815 (1930). The moral and philosophical
basis of this concept of rights and correlative duties is discussed in Fischer v. Meader,
95 N.J. 59, 111 A. 503 (1920). It was held in England that the father had rights
superior to those of the mother of the child because it was he who fulfilled the
parental duties. In King v. Greenhill, 4 Adol. & E. 624, 111 Eng. Rep. 922 (K.B. 1836),
the child was taken from a capable mother and delivered to a libertine father on the
basis of this notion. See 4 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAws 17 (1936).
13. Purinton v. Jamrock, 195 Mass. 187, 80 N.E. 802 (1907) ; Stearns v. Allen, 183
Mass. 404, 67 N.E. 349 (1903); In re Adoption of Morrison, 267 Wis. 625, 66 N.W.
732 (1954) ; Shepard, Adoption Without Conrent of Nratural Parents, 17 CASE & COM.
391, 395 (1911). In Fischer v. Meader, 95 N.J. 59, 111 A. 503 (1920), the court up-
held the adoption of an abandoned child and founded the decision not upon the best
interests of the child but upon the welfare of the state itself.
14. Winans v. Luppie, 47 N.J. Eq. 302, 305, 20 A. 969, 970 (1890) ; In re Cohen's
Adoption, 155 Misc. 202, 279 N.Y. Supp. 427 (1935). The "rights of the natural parents
cannot be terminated by adoption merely because the adoptive parents would be better
qualified to provide for the economic and temporal wellbeing of the child. Jackson v.
Russell, 342 Ill. App. 637, 97 N.E.2d 584 (1951); Cormack v. Marshall, 211 Ill. 519,
71 N.E. 1077 (1904); Matter of Livingston, 151 App. Div. 1, 135 N.Y. Supp. 328
(1912). See Lacher v. Venus, 177 Wis. 558, 188 N.W. 613 (1922).
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
insufficient basis for a nonconsensual adoption.15
Abrogation of the necessity for consent of mentally ill parents in an
adoption is, then, an extreme measure since it is a taking of the child
against the will of the parent even though there has been no willful act,
such as abandonment, to forfeit the parental rights. The need for such
an extension of adoption policy was probably brought forth by the cases
which held that mentally ill persons were not capable of consenting to an
adoption.16 Attempts were made to have mental illness declared equivalent
to abandonment but were unsuccessful because of a lack of intention to
forego parental rights." This judicial interpretation made it evident that
if the children of mentally diseased parents were to be adopted at all there
had to be a statutory provision making unnecessary the consent of these
persons in adoption proceedings. Such enactments are justified by the
effects of failure to provide for the adoption of children of all mentally ill
persons. In cases of permanent mental disease the child would be relegated
to an institution during minority and permanently deprived of an oppor-
tunity to grow up in a home as a member of a family. Such a deprivation
need not result from a curb on adoption of children whose parents are
afflicted with a mental disease of limited duration.
Mental disorders can be categorized into three major groups which
differ as to treatment, symptoms, and, most important for the present
inquiry, in the response to treatment and possibility of recovery. These
three major groups are mental deficiency,18 organic disorder, 9 and
15. Glass v. Bailey, 118 N.E.2d 800 (Ind. 1954); People ex rel. Dunlap v. New
York Juvenile Asylum, 58 App. Div. 133, 68 N.Y. Supp. 656 (1901). Unlike adoption,
custody is temporary and does not affect the inheritance rights of the child. See Jack-
son v. Russell, 342 Ill. App. 637, 97 N.E.2d 584 (1951) ; Hill v. Allabaugh, 333 Ill. App.
602, 78 N.E.2d 127 (1948) ; Note, 2 Wis. L. REV. 160 (1923). Visitation privileges for
the natural parents, moreover, are a matter of right in custody proceedings. See, e.g.,
Major v. Welch, 122 N.E.2d 79 (Ind. 1954).
16. Keal v. Rhydderck, 317 Ill. 231, 148 N.E. 53 (1925) ; Molin Adoption, 34 Del.
Co. 470 (Pa. 1946).
17. State ex rel. Monroe v. Ford, 164 La. 149, 113 So. 798 (1927) ; Molin Adop-
tion, 34 Del. Co. 470 (Pa. 1946). There is no abandonment because there was neither
an attempt to abandon nor to forego all parental rights. Ibid. But see Sandine v.
Johnson, 188 Iowa 620, 176 N.W. 638 (1920).
18. Mental deficiency is a disorder which lasts from birth until death and in which
the person affected has a mentality, or intelligence, considerably lower than the average
person. In many cases the lack of intelligence is so pronounced that the person is
unable to care for himself and, for his own personal safety, is kept in permanent
confinement. There is not a great problem involved in the adoption of children whose
parents are mentally deficient once the nature of the afflication is determined because
of the permanent nature of the malady and the lack of possible improvement. However,
there is an initial problem in determining that the person is a mental deficient and not
merely afflicted with a temporary disorder which has symptoms similar to those of
mental deficiency. For a thorough discussion of mental deficiency in non-psychiatric
terminology see Jervis, The Mental Deficiencies, 286 ANNALS 25 (1953). For more
technical discussions see LANDIS AND BOLLES, TEXTBOOK OF ABNOR-MAL PSYCHOLOGY C. 17
NOTES
psychosis. "
There is little regard for this tripartite classification in the adoption
statutes. Ten states allow obviation of parental consent when the parent
is "insane" ;21 ten others require only a previous adjudication of mental
illness or of "insanity. ' 2- However, there is a signal absence of appellate
litigation of adoptions involving a mentally ill parent.23 The constitution-
ality of a statute with such a provision was challenged recently in Illinois. 24
The statute, which was held not to contravene the due process clause of
(1950); NoyEs, MODERN CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY C. 28 (1948).
19. Organic disorder is a situation in which there has been structural damage to
the brain tissue caused by infection or physical injury. Since nerve tissue does not
regenerate this variety of mental illness is permanent. See Weinstein, Alvord, and
Rioch, Disorders Associated with Disturbances of Brain Function, 286 ANNALS 34
(1953) ; Strauss and Savitsky, Head Injury: Neurologic and Psychiatric Aspects, 31
ARCH. NEUROL. & PSYCHIAT. 893 (1934); LANDIS & BOLLES, op. cit. supra note 18,
c. 13; NoYEs, op. cit. supra note 18, c. 14.
20. The psychoses compose the largest of the three categories. They are a group
of mental disorders which vary widely in effect on the patient's behavior and in
response to treatment. These are such diseases as schizophrenia, manic depressive psy-
chosis, and diseases of the senium. For a detailed listing of such disorders see NoYEs,
op. cit. supra note 18, at 123-25. The psychoneuroses may be grouped with the psychoses
because they are both psychogenic and both generally not permanent although in each
there may be certain cases which are lifelong. Psychoneuroses have been described as
a link between the average mind and the psychotic personality. NOYES, Op. cit. supra
note 18, at 270. Among the psychoses and psychoneuroses there is not only a different
possibility of recovery for each particular disorder, but there are great variances
among individual cases suffering from the same affliction. To determine the per-
manence of the illness of any one individual requires more than a mere discerning of the
classification of the malady; a study of the individual case is necessary. See Ginsburg,
The Neuroses, 286 ANNALS 55 (1953) ; Lewis, Criteria for Early Differential Diagnosis
of Psychoneurosis and Schizophrenia, 3 Am. J. PSYCHOTHERAPY 4 (1949) ; LANDIS &
BOLLES, op. cit. supra note 18, c. 8-12; NOYES, op. cit. supra note 18, c. 23-27; id. at 40.
21. ALA. CODE tit. 27, § 3 (1940) ; ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-106 (1947) ; GA. CODE
ANN. § 74-404 (Supp. 1951); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 453.040 (Vernon 1949); N.Y. Dolt.
REL. LAW § 111; N.D. REv. CODE § 14-1104 (Supp. 1953); ORE. Comp. LAWS Ann. §
109.320 (1940); R.I. GEN. LAWS c. 420, § 3 (1938). Miss. CODE ANN. § 1269 (1942)
("Mentally and/or morally unfit.") ; W. VA. CODE ANN. § 4755 (1949) (If both parents
are insane.).
22. ARiz. CODE ANN. § 27-203 (Supp. 1952); KY. REv. STAT. § 199.500 (1953);
MICH. Con. LAws § 710.3 (1948); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.24 (West Supp. 1954);
N.J. REv. STAT. § 9:3-24 (Supp. 1953); OnIO Rrv. CODE § 3107.06 (1954); S.D. CODE
§ 14.0403 (1939); TENN. CODE ANN. § 9572.21 (Williams Supp. 1952); WASH. REV.
CODE § 26.32.040 (1951); Wyo. ComnP. STAT. ANN. § 58-211 (1945).
23. This is attributable to the paucity of such adoptions. Letter from John War-
ren Hill, Presiding Judge of Domestic Relations Court, City of New York, to Indiana
Law Journal, March 18, 1955; letter from John M. Booth, Associate Judge of Juvenile
Court, Providence, R.I., to Indiana Law Journal, March 31, 1955; letter from DeWitt
S. Crow, Circuit Judge, Springfield, Ill., to Indiana Law Journal, March 16, 1955.
About ten such cases a year occur in the Cleveland, Ohio, area. Letter from Walter
T. Kinder, Presiding judge, Probate Court of Cuyahoga County, Ohio, to Indiana Law
Journal, March 15, 1955. Though there are few of these adoptions they are frequent
enough to merit attention. If there are ten in one county, it is reasonable to assume
that in the entire forty eight states the number is not insignificant.
24. People ex rel. Nabstedt v. Barger, 3 Ill.2d 511, 121 N.E.2d 781 (1954).
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the Fourteenth Amendment, provides that the parent must have been
mentally ill for a period of three years25 and requires that two qualified
physicians ascertain that the patient will not recover in the foreseeable
future ;26 after these determinations, the court may appoint a guardian ad
litem to represent the parent and consent to the adoption.27
The battery of safeguards which Illinois provides is unique among
the states. In but eight of the twenty-eight states allowing adoption against
the will of a mentally diseased parent is there any specification that the
illness be incurable.2" Only one of these eight states, Illinois, requires a
period of illness;29 three states, not requiring an incurable affliction,
insist on such a period." A medical determination of the probable dura-
tion of the disease is required in but two states. 1
Frequently the mental condition of the parent is to be determined by
an agency, such as a state or county board of public welfare2 or a private
child placing agency.33 It is never specified that the agencies utilize
psychiatric or even medical assistance in reaching their decision concern-
ing the mental condition of the parent."4 Some states require a written
report of the agency"5 as a part of the court record, but many statutes
lack any requirement to build a record of the hearing." A few states pro-
25. ILL. ANN. STAT. C. 19, § 19.012(10 1/2) (Supp. 1953).
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid.
28. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1104 (Supp. 1954); ILL. ANN. STAT. C. 19, §
19.012(10 1/2) (Supp. 1953); IOWA CODE ANN. § 600.3 (Supp. 1954); ME. REV. STAT.
c. 158, § 37 (1954); MASS. ANN. LAWS c. 210, § 3 (Supp. 1953); NEv. COMP. LAWS
§ 9478 (Supp. 1941); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-9 (Supp. 1953); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 1,
§ 2 (Supp. 1954).
29. ILL. ANN. STAT. C. 19, § 19.012(10 1/2) (Supp. 1953).
30. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-106 (1947); Ky. REV. STAT. § 199.500 (1953); WASH.
REV. CODE § 26.32.040 (1951).
31. ILL. ANN. STAT. C. 19, § 19.012 (10 1/2) (Supp. 1953); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
1, § 2 (Supp. 1954).
32. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 27, § 2 (1940) ; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1107 (1953);
GA. CODE ANN. § 74-410 (Supp. 1951); Ky. REv. STAT. § 199.510 (1953); ME. REV.
STAT. C. 158, § 37 (1954); MASS. ANN. LAWS c. 210, § 3A (Supp. 1953); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 259.27 (West Supp. 1954); S.D. CODE § 14.0406 (Supp. 1952); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 9572.21 (Williams Supp. 1952).
33. See, e.g., MICH. CoiuP. LAWS § 710.5 (1948); WASH. REv. CODE § 26.32.090
(1951). It appears anomalous to permit an agency, actively interested in placing a child
for adoption, to investigate the condition of the natural parents.
34. See notes 32, 33 supra.
35. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 27, § 2 (1940) ; Ky. REV. STAT. § 199.510 (1953) ; S.D.
CODE § 14.0406 (Supp. 1952).
36. Ariz., Del., Ill., Ky., Me., Mass., Miss., Mo., N.J., N.Y., N.D., Ore., R.I.,
S.D., Tenn., Wash., W.Va., Wyo. But see IowA CODE ANN. § 600.8 (1950); MIcH.
CoMe. LAWS § 711 (1948) ; NEv. CoMip. LAWS § 9482 (1929) ; OHIO REV. CODE § 3107
(1954); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 4 (Supp. 1954).
NOTES
vide for a guardian to "give or withhold consent" for the parent." These
guardians are court appointed, however, and are not required to champion
actively the rights of the mentally ill parent.
The mere fact of "insanity" or that of commitment to or voluntary
confinement in a mental institution, which are the standards for involun-
tary adoption in twenty states,"8 is an insufficient basis for permitting
a permanent severance of the parental relationship. The standard for com-
mitment to an institution for the mentally ill is, and should be, that a
mental disease exists and is serious enough to warrant institutional treat-
ment,3 9 but the application of this same standard to adoption situations
invites appalling results.4" Such a standard permits the adoption of
children against the will of a parent only temporarily afflicted with a
mental illness. As adoption is permanent,41 the parent so afflicted would,
upon recovery, be deprived of the child and the child would have been
unnecessarily transferred from his natural family. Thus this extreme
invasion of the parental interest also offends the interest of the child.42
37. ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 19, § 19.012(10 1/2) (Supp. 1953); MICH. ComP. LAWS §
710.3 (1948); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.25 (West Supp. 1954); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-9
(Supp. 1953); OHIO REv. CODE § 3107.06 (1954); ORE. Comtp. LAWS Ann. § 109.320
(1940); R.I. GEN. LAWS c. 420, § 3 (1938); TENN. CODE ANN. § 9572.21 (Williams
Supp. 1952).
38. See notes 21, 22 supra.
39. See, e.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS c. 123, § 51 (Supp. 1954); MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 525.753 (West Supp. 1954); N.Y. MENT. HYG. LAW § 70; NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF
MENTAL HEALTH, FEDERAL SECURITY AGENCY, A DRAv AcY GOVERNING HOSPITALIZA-
TION OF THE MENTALLY ILL § 6 (rev. ed. 1952).
40. An example is the situation in People ex rel. Strohsahl v. Strohsahl, 221 App.
Div. 86, 222 N.Y. Supp. 319 (1927). A father had been in a mental institution for
three years; a year after his discharge from the hospital his son was adopted without
the father's consent. The appellate court, in construing the statutory language "ad-
judicated to be insane," declared that at the time of the adoption the father, though
discharged, had not yet been adjudged sane and, therefore, his consent was not neces-
sary to perfect the adoption. This was despite the fact that at the time of the adop-
tion there had been no statutory provision for an adjudication of sanity and that when
such a statute was enacted, after the adoption but before the appeal, the father had acted
promptly in obtaining a declaration of sanity.
41. See note 2 supra.
42. "Generally it is better for a child to remain with his natural parents as long as
they wish to have him and do not abuse their powers. Even where temporary measures
may be justified, a permanent change in legal status, although it may produce material
advantages for the child, has intangible effects which are difficult to measure and
foresee. Emotional attachments are not so easily severed as legal ties." 14 U. CHI L.
REv. 303, 306 (1947). It is evident that an adverse psychological impact is more likely
to result in children old enough to have developed substantial emotional attachments to
their natural parents. Also, the degree of traumatic effect will vary with particular
children. Martire and McCandless, Psychological Aspects of the Adoption Process, 40
IowA L. REv. 350, 356. See Newbold, Jurisdictional and Social Aspects of Adoption,
11 MINN. L. REv. 605 (1927). The "popular conception . . . that well-to-do persons,
wishing to share their good fortune, take a child to rear as their own" is contrasted
with several cases of improperly motivated adoptive parents. Id. at 606-07. In DAVID-
SON, FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY 96-97 (1952), having compared the relative merits of foster
437
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It appears fundamental that to give effect to the underlying purpose of
statutes making unnecessary the consent of a mentally ill parent such pro-
visions should be limited in their application to parents whose illness is
considered to be incurable. This standard is considerably more stringent
than the standard for commitment to a mental institution,4 3 just as adop-
tion is more permanent in its effect than is commitment.
It is one matter to formulate a standard requiring that parental con-
sent may be abrogated only if a parent's mental illness is incurable; it is
quite another matter to establish a procedure by which this prognosis of no
recovery may be fairly and accurately determined. Such a determination
is a legal problem but is not capable of solution without recourse to infor-
mation concerning the nature of mental illness.
The changing character of care of the mentally ill has done much to
decrease the likelihood of incurability of any specific case of mental
disease.4 The entire philosophy of psychotherapy has been transformed
from custodial to curative in recent years. 5 The treatments which are now
most common, and, until very recently, most effective, 6 in mental hos-
pitals were developed a relatively short time ago.
homes and orphanages in placing the child of a mentally ill parent, it is concluded that
it requires a "nice psychiatric judgment [as to] whether, even with a psychotic back-
ground, the natural mother cannot, in the long run, provide the best care for her child."
In Risting v. Sparboe, 179 Iowa 1133, 162 N.W. 592, 594 (1917), it was declared that
"human experience has demonstrated that children ordinarily will be best cared for
by those bound to them by the ties of nature, 'bone of their bone and flesh of their
flesh.' . . . [T]he law raises a strong presumption that the child's welfare will be best
subserved in the care and control of parents." See In re McFarland's Guardianship, 214
Iowa 417, 239 N.W. 702 (1931).
43. See note 40 supra and accompanying text.
44. "The last twenty-five years have brought about significant improvement in the
end results of psychiatric treatment. The most striking finding is the shortened time
that patients with recoverable mental illnesses need to spend in the hospital." Barton,
Hospital Services for the Mentally Ill, 286 ANNALS 107, 109 (1953). See note 3 supra.
See notes 45, 47 infra. Between 1940 and 1949 the percentage of annual discharges
from mental institutions increased 36.0%, and during the same period the percentage of
annual first admissions to institutions increased only 15.1%. NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF
MENTAL HEALTH, FEDERAL SECURITY AGENCY, PATIENTS IN MENTAL INSTITUTIONS 1949
17 (Public Health Service Pub. No. 233, 1952).
45. This change of emphasis from the custodial aspects to the curative was "sym-
bolized by the change in official institutional nomenclature from 'asylum' to 'hospital.'
Newer institutions tended to cast off the forbidding external appearances that charac-
terized most nineteenth century asylums." DEUTCH, THE MENTALLY ILL IN; AAMERICA
442-43 (1949). See Ross, Hospitalization of the Voluntary Mental Patient, 53 MICH.
L. REv. 353 (1955). See note 3 supra.
46. See note 3 supra.
47. The efficacy of insulin in convulsive therapy was discovered in 1933, and the
most familiar treatment, electric shock therapy, was first introduced in 1938. DEUTCH,
op. cit. supra note 45, at 498-500. "Electric shock therapy produces significant improve-
ment in states of tension and agitation, in depressions and in excitements. Insulin coma
enhances the chance of recovery when used in the treatment of schizophrenic reactions."
Barton, op. cit. supra note 44, at 108.
NOTES
The difficulties in the task of determining the duration of the illness
are compounded by the continuing development of treatments but even
within the framework of currently known therapies such a diagnosis
is a difficult task.4" The patient's disorder must be classified in one of
the three major groups-psychosis, mental deficiency, or organic disorder.
Psychosis may be curable;4 mental deficiency"0 and organic afflictions"1
are usually permanent. It is clear that a more accurate prediction of
duration of mental illness will emanate from an examination by a psychia-
trist than by a physician.52 A physician has neither the training nor ex-
perience of a psychiatrist in diagnosing mental illness, and it is evident
that a correct diagnosis as to type of disorder is essential to an accurate
prediction of duration. Each advance in psychiatric knowledge, because
of the specialized nature of care of the mentally ill, renders the ordinary
physician relatively less able than a psychiatrist to make determinations
of mental illness.
If the illness of the parent is determined by a psychiatrist to be one of
the possibly temporary psychoses, there is still little basis for an immediate,
accurate prognosis as to the duration of the infirmity. To make such a
48. "Every mental disorder is an individual problem which can be formulated only
after a study of the whole personality, physical, mental, emotional and social, and of
the evolution of these aspects of the particular personality." NoYEs, op. cit. supra note
18, at 40. The diagnosis of organic disturbances is complicated by the fact that certain
psychoses are similar in manifestation to organic disorders and sometimes arise after
the same type injury that might cause an organic deficit. Schilder, Psychic Disturbances
After Head Injuries, 91 Am. J. PsYcHIAT. 155 Passim (1934). "[T]he relationship of
head trauma to the development of mental disorders often presents an important and
difficult problem. Not infrequently the difficulty of this problem is increased by the
fact that the clinical picture may become complicated by the addition of psychogenic
symptoms to an organic syndrome. In order to arrive at an accurate diagnosis it is
often necessary not only to make detailed mental and neurologic examinations but also
to obtain a precise history of the patient's mental status prior to his injury." NoYEs,
op. cit. supra note 18, at 204. Mental deficiency is more readily recognized as such than
is a psychosis. "In the idiots, imbeciles and even lower-grade morons the diagnosis of
feeblemindedness and a rough estimate of its extent are comparatively easy." Id. at 430.
However, the unskilled may tend to err even here, as in People ex rel. Nabstedt v.
Barger, 3 Ill.2d 511, 515, 121 N.E.2d 781, 783 (1954), the examining physician diag-
nosed the patient's disorder as mental deficiency; the psychiatrist established that no
such affliction was present.
49. See note 20 supra.
50. See note 18 supra.
51. See note 19 supra.
52. It is generally conceded that psychiatry has advanced to the degree that a psy-
chiatrist's determinations, as well as treatment, of mental illness are substantially more
accurate than those of an ordinary physician. "Ideally, all medical judgments required
by this Act should be made by fully qualified psychiatrists." NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF
MENTAL HEALTH, FEDERAL SECURITY AGENCY, A DRAFT AcT GOVERNING HoSPITALIZA-
TION OF THE MENTALLY ILL 18 (Public Health Service, Pub. No. 51, rev. ed. 1952). In
utilizing a psychometric examination to determine whether or not a patient is feeble-
minded "the conclusions reached by such examination are of little value unless it is per-
formed by a trained, experienced individual." NoYEs, op. cit. supra note 18, at 117.
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prediction it is necessary to ascertain whether or not the individual re-
sponds to the available known treatments for the particular psychosis."
Such a course of active treatment and observation might take one or two
years ;54 at the completion of the treatment a psychiatrist would be able to
determine whether or not there had been any response. It would not be
necessary for the patient completely to recover in a specified period of
treatment, but after the period it would be possible to found a prediction,
as to the permanence of the illness, on a basis more substantial than a
mere period of prior disorder without active treatment.5 If there is no
favorable response to the known available treatments, the only chances
for recovery are a spontaneous remission or the discovery of a new treat-
ment; but after a mere prior period of illness, however long, it is possible
that there might be a recovery if active treatment were initiated.56 There-
fore, a requirement of a prior period of disease without the further speci-
fication of active treatment is a relatively ineffective safeguard of parental
rights.
The extent of any period must be limited by considerations of the
welfare of the child. During any required period of mental illness or
treatment the child may be in an institution, and, since by far the greatest
demand for children is for infants and those only slightly older,5 7 the
53. Interview with Eldred F. Hardtke, M.D., Clinical Psychiatrist and Acting
Director of Psychological Clinic, Indiana University, March 2, 1955 (hereinafter cited
as INTERVIEW).
54. One year is a reasonable length of time to observe a patient's reactions to
available known treatments in the average state mental institution. Ibid. There is a
plausible analogy between prefrontal lobotomy and nonconsensual adoptions of children
of the mentally ill. Both are permanent and both involve determinations of the duration
of the disorder. "[Pirefrontal lobotomy . . . is a drastic and mutilating operation
which should be considered only as a last resort. We certainly would not consider doing
such an operation on a patient who had been here less than two years and on whom
all of the otherwise available treatments had been tried unsuccessfully. I may add that
in most of the relatively few cases in which we have operated the time elapsed has been
a good -deal longer than two years." Letter from Winfred Overholser, M.D., Super-
intendent, Saint Elizabeths Hospital, D.C., to the Indiana Law Journal, April 5, 1955,
on file in Indiana University Law Library. Concerning the medical evidence in de-
termining prospects of recovery Dr. Overholser stated: "[A] minimum of three years
and perhaps even better five years of active treatment would be a desirable minimum."
Ibid.
55. Interview, supra note 53.
56. Ibid. This must be tempered, however, with the fact that treatment is more
effective when instituted early in the illness. Lewis, op. cit. supra note 20 passhin. This
judgment is fortified by the findings of a statistical analysis of persons suffering from
various psychoses and the influence of the period of their illness prior to treatment on
their recovery. Brannon and Graham, Inteisive Itsulirn Shock Therapy-A Five Year
Survey, 111 Am. J. PSYCHIAT. 659, 661-62 (1955).
57. Parents are chary of adopting a child who has formed previous emotional
attachments and who may have been emotionally affected prior to adoption; on the other
hand, very young babies are not always desired because there is no way of knowing if
they will develop normally in mind and body. See Martire and McCandless, op. cit.
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chances for adoption diminish with each year. Recent studies have pointed
up the possible harm to children in remaining in an institution without
maternal care." This argues for a requirement of a period of active
treatment and observation rather than a mere period of "insanity" be-
cause a determination of the duration of the illness by the latter method,
in addition to its inaccuracy, would take considerably longer than the
former. Where a diagnosis of the parent's disorder discloses mental de-
ficiency or an organic deficit, both permanent afflictions, it might also
be desirable to have a period of treatment, concurrent with an interlocu-
tory adoption period, to test the accuracy of the diagnosis.
The singular nature of the procedures in adoption actions"9 raises
certain considerations not involved in many other proceedings. Adoptions
are considered confidential and it is usual to provide for private hearings
and that any records be sealed and inaccessable to the public." A complete
record of an adoption is rarely expressly required by the controlling
statutes."' A strong analogy may be made between adoption and certain
administrative proceedings inasmuch as in both it is incumbent upon the
tribunal and not upon the parties alone, as in the usual adversary action, to
produce the evidence upon which a ruling on the petition is to be based.62
The requirement of a record is a customary safeguard in administrative
actions, 3 and would seem equally advisable in adoption proceedings.64
supra note 42, at 359; Knight, Sowe Problems Involved in Selecting and Rearing
Adopted Children,.5 BULLETIN OF THE MENNINGER CLINIC 65, 69 (1941).
58. "[T]here is a substantial and growing body of evidence, all of which points to
the desirability of placing a child in a permanent home as early, chronologically, as pos-
sible." Martire and McCandless, op. cit. supra note 42, at 359-60. See Levy, Observa-
tions of Attitides and Behavior in a Child Health Center, 41 Am. J. PUBLIC HEALTH
182 (1951).
59. The usual method of initiating adoption proceedings is by a petition. The
party desiring to adopt the child petitions the court. Adoption is not an adversary pro-
ceeding and after the filing of the petition it is incumbent upon the court to determine
the validity of the allegations in the pleadings; e.g., any asserted mental illness of a
natural parent. See 4 VmNmz, AMERICAN FAmILY LAws § 257 (1936). In some states
an agency is designated to perform this fact finding function. See notes 32, 33 supra.
60. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 27, § 5 (1940) ; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1108 (1953);
ME. Rxv. STAT. c. 158, § 39 (1954); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 453.040 (Vernon 1949); OHIo
REv. CoDE § 3107.14 (1954).
61. See note 36 supra.
62. See DAvis, ADMINISTRATIV LAW § 93 (1951). See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 102.35
(1949). "It shall be the duty of the trial examiner to inquire fully into the facts.
The trial examiner shall have authority
"(j) To call, examine and cross-examine witnesses, and to introduce into the record
documentary or other evidence." Ibid.
63. See DAvis, op. cit. supra note 62, at § 88. Federal administrative agencies are
required to maintain records of a rather complete nature. Administrative Procedure
Act, 60 Stat. 242 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1007 (1952).
64. A complete record is required by several statutes authorizing sterilization of
mental deficients. "The said board shall preserve and keep all record evidence offered
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It may be argued in the case of adoption that the secret nature of the
proceedings is an additional reason why it should be necessary to build
a written record. The prime requirement for the building of a record
should be that the court receive and retain written reports from psychia-
trists that the prescribed methods of determining the permanence of the
mental illness have been satisfied.
Such a requisite, however, would offer but little more protection
to the parent than a naked specification that the order be based on the
opinion of a psychiatrist. For in each situation it is entirely possibke
that the only party opposed to the adoption may be incarcerated in a
mental institution.65 In the Barger case a guardian ad litem was appointed
to represent the interests of the mentally ill parent,66 but such an appoint-
ment is permissive and may not be made until the medical testimony has
been obtained ;67 the actual role of the court appointed guardian, therefore,
is to consent to the adoption. An attorney, if appointed counsel for the
parent immediately upon the filing of the petition, could do much to assure
the building of a sufficient record. His role should not be to make deter-
minations or assertions as to the seriousness of fhe mental illness nor
to consent to the adoption, but rather to assume the interests of the parent
and make certain that the prescribed statutory requirements are fulfilled.
The necessity for a complete written record is underscored by the diffi-
culies which the parent, upon recovery, would encounter were no such
record required in attempting to demonstrate on appeal the negative
proposition that the court did not have sufficient evidence to find the
mental disease incurable.
It is possible to make a cogent constitutional argument for the
tempering of the present adoption statutes with these suggested reforms.
The foundation of any such argument will necessarily be the nature of the
rights of the parents to retain their relationship to their children. This
at such hearings and shall have reduced to writing in duplicate all oral evidence so
heard, to be kept with its records." N.H. REv. LAWS c. 160, § 5 (1942). See, e.g., GA.
CODE ANN. § 99-1309 (1955); IDAHO CODE ANNz. § 66-804 (1949); N.C. GEN. STAT. §
35-53 (1950); N.D. REV. CODE § 23-0813 (1943); ORE. ComP. LAWS Ann. § 436.080
(1953) ; S.C. CODE § 32-674 (1952).
65. If the obviation of the consent of the disordered person is in issue the consent
or decease of the other parent may be assumed. It is entirely possible that the child's
other relatives might be as interested in adopting the child as in protecting the parent's
rights. See People ex rel. Strohsahl v. Strohsahl, 221 App. Div. 86, 222 N.Y. Supp.
319 (1927).
66. People ex rel. Nabstedt v. Barger, 3 Ill.2d 511, 514, 121 N.E.2d 781, 782 (1954).
67. ILL. ANN. STAT. C. 19, § 19.012(10 1/2) (Supp. 1953).
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parental interest has long been established as a "natural right,""8 and is
clearly within the definition of liberty granted protection by the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment.69 An invasion, far less
serious than the one involved in adoption, was thwarted by the court as
an unwarranted invasion of the right to "marry, establish a home and
bring up children. ' ' 7° It has been judicially remarked that, though natural,
these rights are not absolute, that they may be subjugated to the welfare
of the child;71 but a court might well have added that no right is absolute. 2
To be valid, an impairment of such natural rights must be justified by
its tendency to further an urgent public interest.
73
68. "A natural affection between the parents and offspring, though it may be
naught but a refined animal instinct, and stronger from the parent down than from the
child up, has always been recognized as an inherent, natural right, for the protection
of which, just as much as for the protection of the rights of the individual to life,
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, our government is formed." Lacher v. Venus,
177 Wis. 558, 569-70, 188 N.W. 613, 617 (1922). "[T]he right of the natural parents to
the custody of their children . . . has ever been regarded, even in primitive civilizations,
as one of the highest of natural rights." Matter of Livingston, 151 App. Div. 1, 7, 135
N.Y. Supp. 328, 332 (1912). See Stearns v. Allen, 183 Mass. 404, 67 N.E. 349 (1903) ;
State ex rel. Monroe v. Ford, 164 La. 149, 113 So. 798 (1927) ; In re Cohen's Adoption,
155 Misc. 202, 279 N.Y. Supp. 427 (1935); Jackson v. Russell, 342 Ill. App. 637, 97
N.E.2d 584 (1951). The importance given natural rights, as such, is the result of more
than a mere climate of opinion; natural rights formed a basic part of the Declaration of
Independence and the spirit of the new republic. Jefferson acknowledged the importance
of these rights by giving import to "certain unalienable rights." 1 PAPERS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 429 (Boyd ed. 1950). The philosophical origin of this concept is discussed
in DUMBAULD, THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (1950); BECKER, THE HEAVENLY
CITY OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY PHnosoPHERs, passim (1932).
69. The Supreme Court of the United States, in discussing the liberty guaranteed
by the Fourteenth Amendment, stated that "the term has received much consideration,
and some of the included things have been definitely stated. Without doubt, it denotes
not merely freedom from bodily restraint, but also the right of the individual to . . .
marry, establish a home and bring up children . . . and generally, to enjoy those
privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness
of free men." Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). In discussing a state
statute which required children to attend public schools, rather than parochial, the Court
declared: "Under the doctrine of Meyer v. Nebraska . . . we think it entirely plain
that the Act . . . unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents and guardians to
direct the upbringing and education of children under their control. . . . The child is
not the mere creature of the state." Pierce v. Society of Sisters of the Holy Names,
268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925). That was the right protected in Meyer v. Nebraska, supra,
is the same right involved in adoption proceedings was recognized in Sinquefield v.
Valentine, 159 Miss. 144, 132 So. 81 (1931). Noted in 5 So. CALIF. L. REv. 161 (1931).
70. Meyer v. Nebraska, supra note 69. The statute held unconstitutional forbade
the teaching of the German language in the schools of the state.
71. See Purinton v. Jamrock, 195 Mass. 187, 80 N.E. 802 (1907); In re Adoption
of Morrison, 267 Wis. 625, 66 N.W. 732 (1954) ; Schlitz v. Roenitz, 86 Wis. 31, 56 N.W.
194 (1893) ; Sullivan v. People, 224 Ill. 468, 79 N.E. 695 (1906).
72. Even the right to life itself is, in capital cases, conditional.
73. The concept that there must be a rational bearing between the means of regu-
lation and the purpose of the exercise of power has been well expressed by Mr.-Justice
Frankfurter: "It is one thing thus to recognize the freedom which the Constitution
wisely leaves to the States in regulating the professions. It is quite another thing,
however, to sanction a State's deprivation or partial destruction of a man's professional
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Such an impairment of parental rights as nonconsensual adoption in-
volves the notions of both substantive and procedural due process. The
opinion in the Barger case discussed the problem in terms of substantive
due process,"4 but, by its discussion of the adequacy of the methods which
the statute provided to determine the permanence of illness, it gave implied
recognition to the procedural due process aspects of the problem. 5
It would be difficult to form a convincing constitutional argument
opposing the obviation of the consent of parents afflicted with an incur-
able mental illness. The public interest in the child permanently deprived
of any home and family would clearly be urgent enough to override the
private interest of the parent, even though that private interest is in the
nature of a natural right. Were the parent afflicted with a disease of a
temporary nature, however, the welfare of the child, which the public
interest seeks to further, would not best be served by an adoption. The
deleterious effects of an unnecessary adoption, though often overlooked,
are well established. 6
An argument founded on the importance of the parental right, how-
ever convincing alone, is enforced by the notion that when the illness is
temporary there is no public interest in the adoption of the child to over-
ride the vigorous private interest of the parent. A statute which makes
parental consent to an adoption unnecessary solely because the parent is
presently mentally ill or "insane," without regard for the future duration
of the illness appears violative of substantive due process.
But a statutory requirement that the mental illness be incurable ac-
complishes nothing in the absence of procedures to assure that the serious-
ness of the disorder be adequately and accurately determined by the court.
The rights of the parent are entitled to protection by the procedural, as
well as the substantive, notion of due process. Diligent protection of the
right to retain one's children is, as guarding a natural right of fundamental
importance in a democratic society, within the intended scope of "the
scheme of ordered liberty" described in Palko v. Connecticut.7  When,
by a failure to provide adequate procedural safeguards, such vital in-
dividual rights are invaded, with no corresponding benefit in the public
interest, there is a patent violation of the procedural guaranties of the
due process clause.
life on grounds having no possible relation to fitness, intellectual or moral, to pursue
his profession." Barsky v. Board of Regents of the University of the State of New
York, 347 U.S. 442, 470 (1954) (Dissent).
74. People ex rel. Nabstedt v. Barger, 3 Ill.2d 511, 516, 121 N.E.2d 781, 783 (1954).
75. People ex rel. Nabstedt v. Barger, 3 Ill.2d 511, 516-17, 121 N.E.2d 781, 784
(1954).
76. See note 42 supra.
77. 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
NOTES
The states currently do not provide adequate safeguards in such adop-
tion proceedings. A psychiatric examination, a period of prior treatment
for the affliction, the necessity of the court to build a written record, and
an actual representation of the interests of the parent are minimum re-
quirements. Substantially more safeguards are commonly found in
statutes authorizing sterilization of mental deficients, 8 a step no more
final than and involving the same individual right as nonconsensual
adoption."
The need for reforming adoption statutes to incorporate the sug-
gested safeguards is sustained by a ubiquitous lack of consideration for
the mentally ill in the adoption statutes. In attempting to support the
welfare of children the states have expanded nonconsensual adoptions to
a point where, with no substantial benefit to the children, the natural rights
of mentally ill parents have been critically impaired. These persons are
fairly entitled to the benefit of those substantive and procedural safe-
guards which will best prevent such an impairment of their natural rights.
78. Statutes authorizing sterilization involve elaborate -medical examinations to
determine the nature of the illness of the patient. See, e.g., IDAH1O CODE ANN. § 66-803
(1949) ; IOWA CODE ANN. § 145.1 (Supp. 1954); KA. GEN. STAT. § 76-151 (1949);
MONT. Rxv. CODES ANN. § 38-603 (1947); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 35-40 (1950); ORE. ComP.
LAWS Ann. § 436.050 (1953); S.C. CODE § 32-671 (1952). Two states provide for a
psychiatric examination. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 5701 (1953); Wis. STAT. § 46.12
(1953). There is sometimes provision for representation by counsel or guardian at the
hearing. KAN. GEN. STAT. § 76-149 (1949); S.C. CODE § 32-673 (1952). A right of
appeal to the supreme court of the state is sometimes provided. See, e.g., N.H. REv.
LAWS c. 160, § 7 (1942) ; ORE. Compr. LAws Ann. § 436.130 (1953) ; UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 64-10-10 (1953); VA. CODE § 37-224 (1950). The requirement to build a written
record in the hearing is common in sterilization statutes. See note 64 supra.
79. There is but superficial merit in any assertion that the right impaired by sterili-
zation differs substantially from that involved in adoption in that the physical body of
the parent, in adoption, is not altered. The impact of such an argument is checked by
the recognition that the impairment of activities wrought by the operations specified -
in the statutes is confined to procreation and does not extend to the sex activities which
would be affected by castration. Another factor not immediately evident is that a
sterilization is often beneficial to the person whose rights are involved in that the
operation may allow him to be released from confinement and return to society. This
fact was one of the primary reasons presented when the Supreme Court of the United
States declared that sterilization of mental deficients did not contravene the due process
clause. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 205-206 (1927). It is significant that in the adop-
tion proceeding there is no such benefit which flows to the mentally ill parent to miti-
gate the loss incurred. Even the nature of the loss itself seems greater in the adoption
situation inasmuch as the children of whom there is a deprivation, unlike in sterilization,
are more than mere abstractions. They are living persons with whom the parent has
had an opportunity to develop an attachment founded on the love and affection which
naturally find fruition in the relationship of parent and child.
